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NĚMECKO A UDRŽOVÁNÍ MÍRU OSN 
Změna na obzoru, nebo vše při starém? 
GERMANY AND UN PEACEKEEPING 
Winds of change or business as usual? 
Jana Urbanovskáa
Abstrakt 
Článek si klade za cíl prozkoumat hlavní trendy v rámci participace Německa na udržování 
míru OSN. Zvláštní pozornost je věnována období od roku 2014, kdy vrcholní němečtí 
političtí představitelé oznámili zvýšenou ochotu zintenzivnit zapojení Německa do 
mezinárodního dění. Z Německa coby váhavého peacekeepera se brzy poté stal 
nejvýznamnější evropský přispěvatel vojenských jednotek do operace OSN na udržení 
míru v Mali (MINUSMA). Diskutována je možnost vzniku nového trendu na poli participace 
Německa na udržování míru OSN.  
Abstract 
The article aims to explore the main trends in German participation in United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping operations. Special attention is devoted to the period since 2014 when 
top German political representatives announced an increased willingness to step up 
German engagement in international affairs. Soon after, Germany shifted from a rather 
hesitant UN peacekeeper to the most significant European troop provider to UN 
peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA). The increased involvement of Germany in 
MINUSMA as a new trend is discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The German attitude to the use of expeditionary forces in the period after the end of the 
Cold War has been characterized by strict restrictions and a persisting culture of restraint. 
Germany has been a political and economic leader in Europe and beyond, however, from 
a military perspective, it was lagging behind his partners.2 At the Munich Security 
Conference 2014, the German political elite unanimously proclaimed German readiness 
to take on more responsibility in international affairs, including in the military sphere.3 
Soon after, Germany turned out to be the second most significant European contributor 
to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in terms of personnel contributions and the most 
significant European troop provider to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).4    
This shift gives us a strong reason to explore German military deployment under the UN 
flag in more detail and to find out whether there are some “winds of change” in the ways 
Germany participates in UN peacekeeping. Since the flagship of the ongoing German UN 
deployments is the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali, special attention is devoted to 
this mission in order to illustrate key patterns that characterize German participation in 
UN peacekeeping. 
From a relatively large pool of studies on German foreign and security policy, only limited 
emphasis has been put on German involvement in UN peacekeeping so far. Ronald D. 
Asmus,5 Hans-Georg Ehrhart6 and Tono Eitel7 analysed early challenges of Germany as a 
new peacekeeper, while Torsten Stein8 focused on the legal constraints of German 
2 BULMER, Simon – PATERSON, William E. Germany as the EU's reluctant hegemon? Of economic 
strength and political constraints. Journal of European Public Policy. 2013, Vol. 20, No. 10, pp. 
1387-1405; BIERLING, Stephan. Vormacht wider Willen: Deutsche Außenpolitik von der 
Wiedervereinigung bis zur Gegenwart. München: C.H.Beck, 2014; HAVLÍK, Vratislav – JANEBOVÁ, 
Pavlína. Fenomén Německa v EU. PITROVÁ, Markéta (ed.). Postlisabonské procesy v Evropské unii. 
Brno: Muni press, 2014, pp. 301-321. 
3 GAUCK, Joachim. Germany’s role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, norms and 
alliances. Speech by Federal President Joachim Gauck at the opening of the Munich Security 
Conference on 31 January 2014 [accessed 10 May 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2LLRR1I; 
STEINMEIER, Frank-Walter. Speech by Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier at the 50th Munich 
Security Conference on 1 February 2014 [accessed 10 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2NL05tH; VON DER LEYEN, Ursula. Speech by the Federal Minister of Defense, Dr. 
Ursula von der Leyen, on the Occasion of the 50th Munich Security Conference on 31 January 2014 
[accessed 10 May 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2XP3LOQ. 
4 UN DPKO. Summary of Troop Contributing Countries by Ranking, 31 May 2018 [accessed 11 May 
2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2JBFO4a. 
5 ASMUS, Ronald D. Germany’s Contribution to Peacekeeping. Issues and Outlook. Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1995. 
6 EHRHART, Hans-Georg. Germany. FINDLAY, Trevor (ed.). Challenges for the New Peacekeepers. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 33-51. 
7 EITEL, Tono. Am I My Brother's Keeper? A German View on UN Peacekeeping. The Brown Journal 
of World Affairs. 1996, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 45-48. 
8 STEIN, Torsten. Germany’s Constitution and Participation in International Peacekeeping 
Operations. Asia Pacific Review. 2000, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 33-40. 
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participation in UN peacekeeping. Joachim A. Koops9 and Nadine Ansorg and Felix Haas10 
explained the motives that make Germany contribute personnel to UN peacekeeping 
operations. Several scholars have concentrated on case studies of German contributions 
to particular missions.11 Last but not least, a number of German experts have issued policy 
papers about German involvement in UN peacekeeping containing an intercession for the 
increased engagement of Germany in the field of UN peacekeeping.12 Still, the number 
and depth of studies on German participation in UN-led missions is considerably lower 
than that of studies on Bundeswehr’s deployments in NATO-led operations. The article 
seeks to narrow the persisting gap in the scholarly literature by analysing German 
participation in UN peacekeeping with a special focus on its contributions to MINUSMA. 
The structure of the article is as follows. In the first part, the nature and scope of German 
contributions is introduced. The second part turns our attention to the UN peacekeeping 
operation in Mali, which currently serves as a flagship of German deployments under the 
UN flag. German motives for its participation in UN peacekeeping with a special emphasis 
on MINUSMA are analysed and the significance of German contributions to MINUSMA for 
the country’s participation in UN peacekeeping from a long-term perspective is discussed. 
The article concludes with a brief outline of the main challenges that Germany as a UN 
peacekeeper is facing.   
Germany as a UN peacekeeper 
German experience with participation in UN peacekeeping operations began at the end 
of the Cold War. Until that point, Bundeswehr troops were not allowed to leave German 
(later NATO) territory.13 After the re-unification of the country in 1990 and with the 
increasing engagement of Germany in international affairs, tensions surrounding 
Bundeswehr’s foreign deployments arose, including within the field of UN peacekeeping. 
These tensions were finally clarified by a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court in 
                                                 
9 KOOPS, Joachim A. Germany and United Nations Peacekeeping: the Cautiously Evolving 
Contributor. International Peacekeeping. 2016, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 652-680. 
10 ANSORG, Nadine – HAAS, Felix. Country Profile: Germany. Providing for Peacekeeping, 2017 
[accessed 11 May 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/30tYpWV. 
11 RAUCH, Andreas M. Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006; GIEßMANN, 
Hans J. – WAGNER, Armin. Armee im Einsatz: Grundlagen, Strategien und Ergebnisse einer 
Beteiligung der Bundeswehr. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009. 
12 NITZSCHKE, Heiko – WITTIG, Peter. UN-Friedenssicherung. Herausforderungen an die deutsche 
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Vereinte Nationen, No. 3, 2007 [accessed 20 April 2019]. Available 
from:  http://bit.ly/2XzDmVK; GRIEP, Ekkehard – NACHTWEI, Winfried. Für eine politische 
Aufwertung der VN-Friedenssicherung in Deutschland – Ungenutzte Chancen im VN-Peacekeeping 
nutzen. DGVN Policy Paper, No. 1, 2011 [accessed 20 April 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2YTEj7S; KAIM, Markus – STRAUß, Lena. More German ‘Blue Helmets’. Four Reasons 
the Federal Republic of Germany Should Show Greater Commitment to UN Peacekeeping. SWP 
Comments, No. 29, 2017 [accessed 20 April 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2Lc5fwz; GLATZ, 
Rainer L. – HANSEN, Wibke – KAIM, Markus – VORRATH, Judith. Die Auslandseinsätze der 
Bundeswehr im Wandel. SWP-Studie, No. 7, 2018 [accessed 20 April 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2Laerlj. 
13 ANSORG – HAAS, ref. 10, p. 4; ASMUS, ref. 5.  
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1994 that permitted foreign deployments, including combat troops, under the conditions 
that stemmed from the constitution.14  
Most of German contributions to UN peacekeeping have consisted of limited number of 
military observers (e.g. UN Observer Mission in Georgia – UNOMIG, UN–African Union 
Mission in Darfur – UNAMID, UN Mission in the Sudan – UNMIS, or UN Mission in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea – UNMEE) or police units (e.g. UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina – UNMIBH, UN 
Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK, or UN Mission in Liberia – UNMIL). Other contributions have 
focused on specialist units such as medics, engineers, or transport capability. An 
exception to this pattern has been the German contribution to the maritime component 
of UNIFIL in Lebanon.15 Overall, emphasis has been put on capacity building, non-combat 
military contributions and the civilian dimension of UN peacekeeping.  
Alongside personnel contributions, Germany has always heavily supported UN 
peacekeeping through financial assets. In the long term, Germany has been the most 
significant European financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget. In 2018, 
Germany contributed 6.39% of assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. This 
makes Germany the fourth largest financial contributor after the United States (28.47%), 
China (1025%) and Japan (9.68%).16 
As of April 2019, Germany provided 540 persons in total (23 police officers, 13 military 
observers, 482 troops and 22 staff officers) to ongoing UN peacekeeping operations.17 
These numbers mean that Germany occupies the 38th position in the ranking of countries 
contributing personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (which includes police, military 
experts on mission, staff officers and troops) out of 122 participating countries.18 A year 
earlier, Germany even occupied the 28th position in the ranking of police and troop 
contributors, which made the country the second largest EU and second largest NATO 
contributor to UN peacekeeping.19  
When we compare German contributions to UN peacekeeping with contributions of other 
European countries, we can see that Germany is the fifth largest European contributor to 
UN peacekeeping, after Italy, France, Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom.20 
14 STEIN, ref. 8; EHRHART, ref. 6, p. 39-41. 
15 ANSORG – HAAS, ref. 5, p. 1-2. 
16 UN DPKO. How we are funded, 2019 [accessed 15 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2XVI2Vl. 
17 UN DPKO. Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and Post, 30 April 2019 
[accessed 15 May 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2xDTQg6. 
18 UN DPKO. Summary of Troop Contributing Countries by Ranking, 30 April 2019 [accessed 15 May 
2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2XEjT1x. 
19 UN DPKO. Summary of Troop Contributing Countries by Ranking, 31 May 2018 [accessed 15 May 
2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2JBFO4a. 
20 UN DPKO, ref. 9.  
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Table 1: Selected European contributions of uniformed personnel to UN 
peacekeeping operations as of April 2019  
 Police  UNMEM Troops  Staff 
officers 
Total  
Italy  4 4 1,149 27 1,184  
France  29 2 671 51 753 
Spain  11 5 617 15 648 
Ireland 12 15 573 18 618 
United 
Kingdom 
0 4 556 25 585 
Germany 23 13 482 22 540 
World-wide 
contributions 
to UN PKO 
10,385 1,341 75,079 1,991 88,796 
Source: Figures taken from UN DPKO. Troop and Police Contributors, 2019 [accessed 15 May 2019]. 
Available from: http://bit.ly/2XDHGU8. 
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The following chart shows the development of German participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations in the period from 1990 until present. Three peaks are clearly visible, owing 
to exceptionally high German contributions to UN Operation in Somalia II in 1993, UN 
Interim Force in Lebanon in 2006-2007 and MINUSMA since 2016.  
Chart 1: Development of German participation in UN peacekeeping 1990-2019 
Source: Figures taken from UN DPKO. Troop and Police Contributors, 2019 [accessed 15 May 2019]. 
Available from: http://bit.ly/2XDHGU8. 
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Currently, Germany is represented in more than half of the ongoing UN peacekeeping 
operations. The geographical distribution of German contributions is relatively broad, 
reaching from Latin America through Africa and Europe to the Middle East. This rules out 
any clear selectivity of German deployments based on the area of deployment.  
Table 2: Ongoing German UN peacekeeping deployments as of April 2019  
Mission Mission title  Start of 
German 
deployment   
Number of 
German 
soldiers  
MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara 
6/1993-
7/1996; 
5/2003; 
11/2013- 
3 EoM21 
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo 
6/1999- 1 P22 
UNIFIL  UN Interim Force in Lebanon 10/2006- 126 T23 + 2 
SO24 
UNAMID African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur 
11/2007- 6 P + 3 SO 
UNMISS UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan 8/2011- 10 EoM + 3 
SO 
MINUSMA UN Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali 
7/2013- 356 T + 12 P 
+ 14 SO 
UNSOM25 UN Assistance Mission in Somalia 2/2016- 3 P 
MINUJUSTH UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti 10/2017- 1 P 
                                                 
21 EoM = expert on mission 
22 P = police officer 
23 T = troops 
24 SO = staff officer 
25 Political mission  
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Source: Figures taken from Bundeswehr. Einsatzzahlen – die Stärke der deutschen Kontingente, 5 
July 2019 [accessed 9 July 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/32hulzC; Federal Foreign Office. UN 
peace missions and Germany’s engagement, 2019 [accessed 10 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2G5czWN; UN DPKO. Summary of Contributions to UN Peacekeeping by Country, 
Mission and Post, 30 April 2019 [accessed 10 May 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/30zWGQ3. 
MINUSMA as a flagship deployment of German peacekeepers 
A flagship of German deployments in the field of UN peacekeeping has recently been the 
UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Currently, it is by far the 
largest German deployment under the UN flag. It deserves our attention because it has 
illustrated a growing German engagement in UN peacekeeping.26 
The operation was established in April 2013 with the goal to restore state authority in 
Mali after the coup in 2012, to support the stabilization of the country, to foster a process 
of reconciliation, to protect civilians and to ensure access to humanitarian help.27   
In March 2019, MINUSMA consisted of 16,453 personnel28 which has made it the third 
largest UN peacekeeping operation after UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (20,486)29 and UN Mission in South Sudan (19,402)30. At the 
same time, due to the continuing escalation of the conflict in Mali, MINUSMA has turned 
out to be the UN’s deadliest deployment, with 195 fatalities as of March 2019.31 
26 GLATZ et al., ref. 12, p. 27.  
27 UN DPKO. MINUSMA Fact Sheet, 2019 [accessed 17 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2NHh4Np. For recent details on MINUSMA and the fragile situation in Mali, see for 
example CHANDLER, Allison – ZOGG, Benno. Mali’s Fragile Peace. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 
No. 215, 2017 [accessed 23 April 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2XYjuuV; TULL, Denis M. 
Mali, the G5 and Security Sector Assistance: Political Obstacles to Effective Cooperation. SWP 
Comments, No. 52, 2017 [accessed 23 April 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2Lg13Mb; 
WEIBEZAHL, Tinko. An African Afghanistan? On the German Troop Deployment in Mali. Global (In-
Security). International Reports, 2018, No. 2, pp. 23-32; TULL, Denis M. UN Peacekeeping in Mali. 
SWP Comments, No. 23, 2019 [accessed 23 April 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2LKh2Sn. 
28 UN DPKO, ref. 19.  
29 UN DPKO. MONUSCO Fact Sheet, 2019 [accessed 17 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/30um9dE. 
30 UN DPKO. UNMISS Fact Sheet, 2019 [accessed 17 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2JxOhFR. 
31 UN DPKO, ref. 19; LEBOVICH, Andrew – MANN, Gregory. Sahel or high water: Mali’s political 
fatalism. ECFR Commentary, 2018 [accessed 23 April 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2xPlYNL. 
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As the following chart shows, Germany belongs to the top ten troop contributing countries 
to the mission. 
Chart 2: Top ten troop contributors to MINUSMA as of March 2019 
Source: Figures taken from UN DPKO. MINUSMA Fact Sheet, 2019 [accessed 17 May 2019]. Available 
from: http://bit.ly/2NHh4Np. 
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The beginning of German participation in MINUSMA dates back to July 2013. German 
engagement in MINUSMA rose steadily, starting with several dozens of police and soldiers 
in 2013 and reaching a peak of 700 in mid-2018.32  
With the decision from April 2018 of the German Bundestag to continue the Bundeswehr’s 
mission in Mali, the troop ceiling has been increased to 1,100. This has made the Mali 
mission – alongside Afghanistan – the Bundeswehr’s largest foreign military engagement.33  
In early April 2019, the German government has decided to extend the mandate for 
Bundeswehr´s participation in MINUSMA until 31 May 2020.34 The decision was 
subsequently adopted by the German Bundestag.35 
Chart 3: Development of German contributions to MINUSMA 
 
Source: Figures taken from UN DPKO. Troop and Police Contributors, 2019 [accessed 17 May 2019]. 
Available from: http://bit.ly/2XDHGU8. 
                                                 
32 UN DPKO. Troop and Police Contributors, 2019 [accessed 17 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2XDHGU8.  
33 WEIBEZAHL, ref. 19, p. 24. 
34 The Federal Government of Germany. German government extends missions in Mali, 3 April 
2019 [accessed 20 May 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2XzbZv3. 
35 The Federal Government of Germany. Extension of Bundeswehr foreign missions, 10 May 2019 
[accessed 20 May 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2S9rpQW. For more details, see: Deutscher 
Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht – 98. Sitzung, 9 May 2019 [accessed 20 May 2019]. Available 
from: http://bit.ly/2XSgAb7. 
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Discussing German motives for participation in MINUSMA 
The stabilization of Mali is a central part of German engagement in the Sahel region and 
a crucial task of the German government’s policy towards Africa. Naturally, Germany is 
interested in fighting terrorism, organized crime, poverty and illegal migration in the 
Sahel region, which all have negative consequences for the security and stability in 
Europe. Through its participation in MINUSMA, Germany hopes to contribute to the 
mitigation of effects of these problems in Mali and the Sahel region.36 In the current 
globalized world, peace and stability in distant places are connected to the security and 
well-being of Europe. For Germany, as the biggest economy in Europe and a globally 
important export country, stability in other regions of the world is vitally important.37  
Beyond the desire to mitigate the root causes of threats that have a potential spill over 
effect impacting Europe, there is a whole array of other, no less significant motives for 
German participation in MINUSMA. Firstly, German motivation to provide contributions to 
UN peacekeeping is closely connected to the “responsibility discourse”. This discourse is, 
to be sure, nothing new. The rhetoric of “taking on more global responsibility” and being 
a “good international citizen” has been a permanent feature of German foreign and 
security policy since the early 1990s. The commitment to exercise increased international 
responsibility, particularly with regard to international peace and security, is – not 
surprisingly – derived from the German experience with its own past, mainly as a 
consequence of its role in two world wars and the wrongdoings of the Nazi regime. 
In the case of Mali, the “responsibility discourse” resonates especially strongly. The 
stepping up of German contributions to MINUSMA is associated with the most recent wave 
of the debate on increased international responsibility which was launched by the seminal 
speeches of Federal President Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
and Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen at the Munich Security Conference in 2014. 
These top German political representatives unanimously called for Germany to take on 
more responsibility in the world. One dimension of this postulate was that Germany would 
become more actively involved with the UN than it had before.38 As Markus Kaim and Lena 
Strauß point out, German deployment in Mali appears to be exemplary in meeting 
international responsibilities.39  
The commitment to a more active role in world affairs has been confirmed in the latest 
White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (2016). Here 
the German government once again stressed its willingness to assume more responsibility 
36 Auswärtiges Amt. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinten Nationen und einzelnen, global agierenden, 
internationalen Organisationen und Institutionen im Rahmen des VN-Systems in den Jahren 2014 
und 2015, p. 16 [accessed 20 May 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2Jndp33. 
37 GRIEP, ref. 12, p. 1-2.  
38 KAIM – STRAUß, ref. 12, p. 2. 
39 Ibid. p. 3. 
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in matters of peace and security, to strengthen the UN and to enable it to perform its 
tasks more efficiently.40 
Solidarity, partnerships and commitment to multilateralism are other motives that 
explain German participation in MINUSMA. It was solidarity with France and a positive 
response to calls for burden-sharing which played an important role in the legitimization 
process leading to German contributions to MINUSMA, especially at the beginning of 
Germany’s deployment.41 
Generally speaking, the perceived need to fulfil the expectations of partners and 
international institutions (NATO, UN, EU) is a significant issue for Germany. In fact, these 
expectations heavily influence decision-making processes in the field of German military 
deployments.42 In the scholarly literature, this phenomenon has been identified as a 
“multilateralism trap” which expresses the way external pressures to act in the name of 
multilateralism limit German foreign policy options. The pressure is sometimes so strong 
that it becomes almost impossible for Germany to refuse to participate. Otherwise, 
Germany would risk losing its image and reputation as a reliable, responsible ally that is 
committed to multilateralism.43 
Next to the Franco-German relationship, another important rationale for German 
participation in Mali has been to strengthen the German-Dutch partnership. There is a 
strong link between Germany’s intensive cooperation with Dutch forces in the NATO-led 
ISAF operation in Afghanistan and its commitment in MINUSMA. One of the lessons of the 
Afghanistan deployment was the importance of having NATO allies as co-participants. 
When Germany considered increasing its contributions to MINUSMA at the beginning of 
2016, the Dutch-German bilateral partnership along with the ongoing process of 
deepening their integration and cooperation in the fields of security and defence proved 
to be the crucial incentive for an expanded German deployment. So, while the initial and 
rather modest German contribution to MINUSMA in 2013 was a response to a French 
request, the increased role of the Bundeswehr in Mali during 2016 was a result of the 
Dutch-German partnership.44 
Last but not least, what has also proved helpful was the previous engagement of Germany 
in the region, albeit in a different institutional context. Strong contributions of Germany 
to the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) as well as a leading role in the civilian crisis 
management mission EUCAP Sahel Mali set a path for German engagement in MINUSMA.45 
40 The Federal Government. White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr. 2016, p. 62-63 [accessed 21 May 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/2Jpk1hj. 
41 KOOPS, ref. 9, p. 670-671. 
42 KAIM, Markus. Deutsches Interesse versus Bündnissverpflichtungen: Zur Frage nationaler 
Handlungsspielräume bei Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr. GIEßMANN, Hans J. – WAGNER, 
Armin (eds.). Armee im Einsatz. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009, pp. 176-185. 
43 Ibid. p. 181. 
44 KOOPS, ref. 9, p. 669-671. 
45 Ibid. p. 668. 
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Is Germany a rising peacekeeper?  
Especially in association with MINUSMA, there has been a lot of discussion in recent years 
about the so called European return to UN peacekeeping.46 For sure, MINUSMA has 
provided Germany with an important opportunity to re-engage with the UN peacekeeping 
system.47 The political pressure on Germany to become a leading European power in this 
area (in cooperation with others) has been on the rise. Experts – and German ones in 
particular – have expressed opinion that due to growing military integration within the 
EU, Germany as a partner and a coordinator is becoming more and more indispensable in 
UN peacekeeping.48 The German government itself has stimulated these expectations by 
stressing German willingness and readiness to assume greater responsibility in the world.  
Indeed, since the start of its engagement in MINUSMA, Germany gradually grew into the 
position of the largest European troop contributor to MINUSMA. At the same time, 
MINUSMA has become Bundeswehr’s second largest deployment, with a ceiling of up to 
1,100 soldiers as determined by the mandate of the German Bundestag.49 (By the way, 
the ceiling for German deployment in the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan is very 
close – 1,300 soldiers.50) At the peak of German deployment in MINUSMA in mid-2018, 
Germany was the second largest European contributor to UN peacekeeping operations in 
general, leaving behind powers like France, Great Britain, Spain, or traditional 
peacekeepers such as Ireland.51 
Does this mean that we are witnessing a larger trend of increased German participation 
in UN peacekeeping? Looking at the participation of Germany from a long-term 
perspective, such a conclusion seems premature. During the period since 1990, when 
Germany started participating in UN peacekeeping, there have been few deviations from 
otherwise token, symbolic contributions – such as Germany’s contribution to the UNOSOM 
mission in Somalia in 1993 or to the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon in 2006-2007 – and none of 
them meant a long-term shift towards greater participation. Also, while Germany’s 
contribution to MINUSMA has risen, the country’s participation in other UN peacekeeping 
operations has remained limited. Whereas in mid-2018, Germany occupied the 28th 
position in the ranking of troop contributors, by April 2019 it has fallen to the 38th position 
                                                 
46 KARLSRUD, John – SMITH, Adam C. Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from 
Mali. International Peace Institute, 2015 [accessed 3 April 2019]. Available from: 
http://bit.ly/2YJKgUX; Daniel, Jan – Wittichová, Markéta. European Re-Engagement in UN 
Peacekeeping? Institute of International Relations Prague, 2006 [accessed 3 April 2019]. Available 
from: http://bit.ly/2XCie17; WECKEMANN, Max. German Return to UN Peacekeeping? Global 
Public Policy Institute, 2016 [accessed 3 April 2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/30qQ2ve; 
KOOPS, Joachim A. – TERCOVICH, Giulia. European approaches to United Nations peacekeeping: 
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47 KOOPS, ref. 9, p. 673. 
48 KAIM – STRAUß, ref. 12, p. 2.  
49 Bundeswehr. Einsatzzahlen – die Stärke der deutschen Kontingente, 5 July 2019 [accessed 9 July 
2019]. Available from: http://bit.ly/32hulzC. 
50 Ibid.  
51 UN DPKO, ref. 32.  
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in the same ranking, becoming the sixth largest European contributor to UN peacekeeping 
at the moment.52 
Despite its rhetoric of “assuming more global responsibility”, including in the field of UN 
peacekeeping, we do not have enough empirical evidence to claim that MINUSMA 
represents a long lasting trend of Germany’s increased engagement within UN 
peacekeeping. So far, it seems more appropriate to understand it as yet another 
exception in otherwise limited German involvement in UN peacekeeping. 
52 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
To sum up, the commitment to take on more responsibility in international affairs – as 
reflected by German participation in UN peacekeeping – seems to be more of an exercise 
in rhetoric than a serious attempt to become a significant UN peacekeeper. Two key 
challenges persist that make it difficult for the German government to turn the 
commitments into reality. Firstly, German public opinion is more sceptical of military 
operations than ever before. As a recent poll of the Körber Stiftung has shown, 52% of 
German citizens prefer that Germany stays away from an increased engagement in world 
affairs, in comparison to 43% German citizens who want their country to be more active.53 
So, despite the rhetoric of German political elites of being ready to assume greater 
international responsibility, the general public still needs to be convinced that Germany 
should do more on the international level. Secondly, in spite of recent decisions to 
increase defence spending and personnel, there are still large gaps in the readiness of the 
Bundeswehr to become a significant actor in international crisis management.54 
Bundeswehr’s shortcomings and its limited deployability in out-of-area military operations 
have been criticized in the latest report by Hans-Peter Bartels, Germany's parliamentary 
commissioner for the armed forces.55 To put it simply, Germany needs to narrow the gap 
between rhetoric and practice. Until then, we will keep waiting for Germany to deliver.  
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